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complicated argument about the uses of fear, about the selective deployment of terror, and about the relation of threat to change.
The Ice-T controversy revealed a crisis in the politics of representation: the censorship activity directed at "Cop Killer" made visible the space of the permissible. It also marked racial violence as a one-way street in America: white violence is not only permitted but legally condoned while the mere representation of black-on-white violence is the occasion for censorship and a paranoid retreat to a literal relation between representation and reality. While a white jury was to blur the line between representation and reality in the case of the video of police brutalizing Rodney King, a white media jury established the stability of this relation in the case of Ice-T. Obviously, the interpretation of the literal is an ideologically valenced act, and in this instance, literality is a traditional political streamlining of complex material.
The eruption of rebellion in the streets of L.A. and its representations in hip hop culture indicate very clearly that violent law demands violent resistance. Tactics of nonviolent resistance developed in the sixties and used nowadays seem to have become dangerously hegemonic rather than disruptive. In political demonstrations, indeed, outrage often takes a back seat to organized, formal, and decorous shows of disapproval. In San Diego, for example, shortly after the L.A. uprising of spring 1992 in the wake of the Rodney King decision, people filled the streets to sing, give speeches, and march upon the police station. What might have been an outpouring of rage and anger and frustration directed at the racist, violent tactics of the local police was transformed rather quickly into a passive and indifferent meeting.
The group of "protesters" actually followed a route laid out for them by a police escort and arrived finally at a deserted police building. After some chanting and shouting, the crowd quietly dispersed. Local newspapers indeed were able to report that in the case of San Diego, the city remained relatively calm in the aftermath of the King verdict. 5 The failure of nonviolent resistance to register anything but the most polite disapproval, I suggest, is the effect of a glaring lack of imagination on the part of political organizers, and an overemphasis on "organization" itself, which often produces determined efforts to eradicate expressions of rage or anger from political protest. Such expressions, after all, might lead to something spontaneous, something that spills across the carefully drawn police lines, something threatening.
When and why and how did rage disappear from the vocabulary of organized political activism? In what follows, I will not attempt a historical or ethnographic answer to this question; rather, using literary and cinematic examples of imagined violence and articulated rage, I elaborate a theory of the production of counterrealities as a powerful strategy of revolt emanating from an increasingly queer postmodern political culture. I use the word "queer" here to denote a postmodern, postidentity politics focused on but not limited to sexual minorities. 6 Postmodernism has been accused of not being political enough but in fact it is political activism that often fails to be postmodern in America in the 1990s. Power and conflict no longer only spring from the domain of politics, and resistance has become as much an effect of popular culture, of videos, films, and novels, as of direct action groups. Postmodernism invites new and different conceptions of violent resistance and its representations. As Michael Taussig writes, we live in a "nervous system," a system characterized as "illusions of order congealed by fear."7 The fear, the order, the nerves are all produced precisely as illusions, fantasies which govern and discipline the self. However, it is also in the realm of fantasy and representation that we make the system nervous, and that we can control and use our illusions. Imagination, in other words, goes both (or many) ways.
So, what if we imagine a new violence with a different object; a postmodern terror represented by another "monster" with quite other "victims" in mind? "What if" denotes a potentiality, a possible reality that may only ever exist in the realm of representation but one which creates an "imagined violence" with real consequences and which corresponds only roughly to real violence and its imagined consequences.
Recently, queer activism has revived an emphasis on loud and threatening political demonstration, and groups like Queer Nation and ACT UP regularly create havoc with their particular brand of postmodern terror tactics. ACT UP demonstrations, furthermore, regularly marshall renegade art forms to produce protest as an aesthetic object. As Douglas Crimp writes in AIDS DEMO-GRAPHICS: AIDS activist art is grounded in the accumulated knowledge and political analysis of the AIDS crisis produced collectively by the entire movement. The graphics not only reflect that knowledge but actively contribute to its articulation as well. 8 Protest in the age of AIDS, in other words, is not separate from representation; and "die-ins," "kiss-ins," posters, slogans, graphics, and queer propaganda create a new form of political response that is sensitive to and exploitive of the blurred boundaries between representations and realities.
Meanwhile in the arena of popular representation, in popular film and video, the lines between representation and reality continue to be starkly drawn. Liberals continue to complain about the violent subject matter that especially kids are exposed to on TV and in cinema. But, I suggest, represented violence takes many forms and some still have the power to produce change. Conventional TV and movie violence, of course, consists of violence perpetrated by powerful white men usually against women or people of color. Such violence is a standard feature of the action genre, of the rock video, of almost every popular form of entertainment, and to a degree it is so expected that audiences may even be immune to it.
On the other hand, violence against white men perpetrated by women or people of color disrupts the logic of represented violence so thoroughly that (at least for a while) the emergence of such unsanctioned violence has an unpredictable power. In recent years, popular texts that prominently feature violence against white men have been thoroughly analyzed by the popular media. So, for example, Ridley Scott's Thelma and Louise created an unprecedented wave of discussions around the issue of violence and women.9 Suddenly, violence, and particularly female revenge fantasy violence, was tagged as "immoral," "extravagant," "excessive," or simply "toxic feminism."10 Debates raged about whether we really want to condone a kind of role reversal that now pits female aggressors against male victims. Women, in other words, long identified as victims rather than perpetrators of violence, have much to gain from new and different configurations of violence, terror, and fantasy. Within the "nervous system" women are taught to fear certain spaces and certain individuals because they threaten rape: how do we produce a fear of retaliation in the rapist? Thelma and Louise is an example of imagined violence that produces or may produce an unrealistic (given how few women carry and use guns) fear in potential rapists that their victims are armed and dangerous. Of course, there is no direct and simple relationship between imagined violence and real effects: just as it is impossible to judge the ways in which pornographic representation interacts with male sexual violence, it would only restabilize the relationship between the imagined and the real to claim that representing female violence quells male attacks.
The "place of rage" where expression threatens to become action is of course that tightly patrolled and highly ambiguous space that we call "fan-tasy." The power of fantasy in the realm of erotic desire has been theorized variously by feminist, psychoanalytic, and postmodern critics. In feminist theory, for example, fantasy constitutes a problematic site for various contests over representation and politics-the pornography debates have posed the question of whether rape and violence against women are in part produced by the objectifying dynamics of pornographic fantasy. Such questions about the relationship between desire and representation have proven to be unanswerable since this relationship is constantly being refigured. In an essay titled "The Force of Fantasy," however, Judith Butler proposes that we rethink the relationship between the "real" and fantasy by refusing to grant the "real" an a priori stability. She suggests that the "real" is "a variable construction which is always and only determined in relation to its constitutive outside: fantasy, the unthinkable, the unreal."1'
What happens when we make imagined violence-as opposed to erotic fantasy-the object of critical scrutiny? What is at stake in this question is the way that sexual fantasies might or might not intersect with violent fantasies to force into visibility the constructed nature of the real. Jordan's "self-determination" takes place within rage, not the rage that explodes mindlessly and carelessly, but a quiet rage, tightly reined, ever so precise and intent upon retribution. "Rights" in the poem signify not simply legal rights but the right to exist, the right to walk at night, the right to write, the right not to be raped, the right to reply, the right to be angry, the right to respond with violence, the right to lawfully inhabit and populate a place of rage: As the distinctions between the real and fantasy collapse upon each other, as representation seems already saturated with realism, as reality is reconstituted by acts of imagination, the effect, I have suggested, is to produce a crisis of spectatorship. We simply do not know how to read imagined violences: all too often representations of the pernicious effects of homophobia, racism, and sexism are collapsed by the viewer into homophobia, sexism, and racism themselves. So, for example, a film about a racist white character might be interpreted as a racist film that produces racial hatred. Or a film about a sexist and homophobic police department that is challenged by outlaw lesbians might be interpreted as a homophobic film about murderous dykes. It is not hard in my last example to find the plot of the controversial film Basic Instinct and it is this film that I want finally to concentrate on because Basic Instinct actually foregrounds the relationship between reality and representation, imagined violence and the maintenance of law and order as major themes.
Disagreements about Basic Instinct tore through queer communities. While the film seemed to some people to move female heroism and cinematic lesbianism to a new and exciting place, others viewed Basic Instinct as a dangerous vision of lesbianism as a network of lesbian murderers. The film therefore drew outraged responses from some members of the gay community who read it as homophobic and as part of a general smear campaign that Hollywood has long maintained against queers. 17 Basic Instinct is indeed a film which weaves a tale of desire and destruction around a web of lesbian killers, but it is not at all clear that this makes it a homophobic film. It became clear rather quickly in the debates around Basic Instinct that not everyone had the same stakes in attacking the film. The protests were led by gay men, for example, and many lesbians involved in the protests changed their minds after actually viewing the film. Many of the gay protesters of Basic Instinct assumed or theorized that homophobia was intricately woven through any and all depictions of gays and lesbians as killers. The psychopathic queer, they claimed, was a homophobic standby in Hollywood cinema and they tried to repress the film by "giving away" the ending of the film and distributing "Catherine Did It" buttons.
The buttons, however, merely underlined the miserable failure of this distinctly traditional and civil disobedience. Viewers of the film will know that there is no ending to give away-the film's conclusion is precisely a question, a question about homophobia, heterosexism, and a question about the possibility that female violence will disrupt once and for all the compulsory heterosexual resolution of narrative. The ending, moreover, is mirrored by the film's beginning scene, literally. The film opens with a shot of a couple having sex on a bed as seen in the mirror over the bed. The camera slowly moves down to fix upon the actual instead of the mirrored scene and as we enter the filmic "real" the sex play turns to murder and the male partner climaxes as his lover ice-picks him. This intricate scene introduces the viewer to both the vexed relationship between fantasy, image, and reality and to the narrative trajectory of the film: what begins in bed will end in bed and what begins in compulsory heterosexuality ends in murder.
The beginning of the film gives away the ending, but in case there is any doubt, Catherine herself destroys all narrative suspense. Catherine, we find out, writes novels that mirror perfectly her life and its violences. Her first book, The First Time, tells of a young boy who murders his parents by rigging a boating accident. Catherine's parents were killed in a boating accident. Her second book, Love Hurts, tells of an aging rock 'n' roll star who is ice-picked to death by his mistress. The book that she is working on when she meets Michael Douglas's character, Nick, is called Shooter (Nick's nickname, although there is obviously a pun here so maybe the film asks us to read "Shooter" as the "real" name and "Nick" as the nickname) and tells of a cop who falls for the wrong woman. "How does it end?" asks Douglas nervously. "She kills him," answers Catherine. Catherine, indeed, did it, but to give away that fact about the film is to give away nothing because narrative resolution is not the focus of the film. Like any good detective mystery, this film is interested in interpretation and the twists and turns of the relationship between crime and punishment, criminal and detective, violence and order. The evidence, in this film, is always textual evidence-Catherine's writing-and the work of detection is always the sorting of fact from fiction and the inevitable blurring of the two.
The gay protesters with their "Catherine Did It" buttons obviously failed to incorporate the kind of postmodern readings of culture that have invigorated many queer protests. As C. Carr wrote in the Village Voice: Gay or straight, the critics were amazingly dense about the film. They saw date rape where there was mutual, exciting, rough sex. They saw "senseless thrill killings" triggered by lesbian sex when, in fact, the murder of a lover, husband, brother, or father is always overdetermined.18 Indeed, murder was no accidental or gratuitous subplot in this film; murder was central not only to the action but also to the character identifications. Every main character in the film is a murderer and murder comes to define relations between the characters and their jobs, their families, their lovers. The murderers however are differentiated by gender: the men in the film who kill do so professionally or in the line of duty; theirs are sanctioned murders. The women-Catherine, her lover Roxie, her ambiguous friend Hazel, the psychiatrist Beth-all kill, as C. Carr pointed out, husbands, lovers, brothers, or fathers: they kept their killing in the family, they disowned their families through violent outbreaks.
Roxie killed her brothers, Hazel her whole family, and the police are stumped as to why they would have done so. The police's inability to find motives for female murder corresponds to their inability to figure out the relation between Catherine's fiction and her life. Female aggression is defined therefore as unreadable, irrational, insane, motiveless, but it is clear that the film suggests a kind of sorority of empathy among the female murderers. They can read each other's murders and the chances are that at least female audiences are all too willing to fill in the blanks when it comes to establishing a motive for the murder of brothers or husbands. But Catherine also knows what the relationship is between novels and reality-ambiguous, undecidable, negotiable.
The very fact that Basic Instinct thematizes the relationship between representation and reality should defend against linear readings of the film when it comes to the characters' sexuality or their criminality. And furthermore, mirroring relationships are continually emphasized throughout the film: each female character is mistaken for every other, one dresses up as and impersonates another, one is killed when Douglas confuses her and Catherine. Also, Douglas is played as a distorted mirror image of Catherine: he slides ever more clearly into a criminal relation to the law and she masters and manipulates his movements as if he were simply a character in a scene she has scripted.
Catherine calls attempts to collapse life into art and art into life "stupid." She knows the difference but is not beyond manipulating the blurred line between them for her own freedom of movement. Similarly, the critics of Basic Instinct who read it as homophobic and misogynist fall victim to the kind of facile reading of right and wrong, real and imagined that in this film only the police are prone to. Collapsing real and imagined is a totalizing activity, it refuses to read difference, it refuses the interpretabil-ity of any given text, and it freezes meaning within a static dynamic of true or false. This, of course, is not to say that texts may never be read as sexist or racist or homophobic-of course they are and can be, but to read homophobia where homophobia and sexism are the targets of an elaborate and prolonged critique is to misread the power of an imagined violence and the violence of imagined power.
Imagined violence, as conceptualized in this paper, is the fantasy of unsanctioned eruptions of aggression from "the wrong people, of the wrong skin, the wrong sexuality, the wrong gender." We have to be able to imagine violence and our violence needs to be imaginable because the power of fantasy is not to represent but to destabilize the real. Imagined violence does not stop men from raping women but it might make a man think twice about whether a woman is going to blow him away. Imagined violence does not advocate lesbian or female aggression but it might complicate an assumed relationship between women and passivity or feminism and pacifism. The imagined violence of lesbians against men in Basic Instinct also recasts the relationship between gay men and lesbians since gay men may well have been threatened by the representation of female violence that empowered lesbians. In this way, imagined violence fractured the fiction of an identity politics.
But unity is not necessarily to be desired, unity is Wojnarowicz's one tribe, an imagined consensus that always covers up difference with platitudes. Let politics be postmodern and queer, postidentity and posthuman. Imagined violences create a potentiality, a utopic state in which consequences are imminent rather than actual, the threat is in the anticipation, not the act. From Ice-T's controversial rock song "Cop Killer" to the feminist killing spree in Thelma and Louise, from the lesbian ice-picker in Basic Instinct to the AIDS-infected junkie in Wojnarowicz's Close to the Knives and the self-determined black woman who talks back in June Jordan's poem, imagined violences challenge white powerful heterosexual masculinity and create a cultural coalition of postmodern terror.
Notes

